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The prejudices of Mary Hays
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Abstract
During the 1790s, Mary Hays was one of the most influential radical novelists and polemicists in
England. She counted amongst her closest friends and mentors the likes of Joseph Johnson, William
Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft. During this tumultuous final decade of the century, she published
two novels, The Memoirs of Emma Courtney and The Victim of Prejudice. Both were controversial in
the extreme, attracting the opprobrium of conservative critics. What caused such consternation was
not merely their vivid description of the myriad political and social injustices suffered by her female
compatriots, but the role of the law in perpetuating such injustices. For much of the last two hundred
years Hays has been a largely forgotten figure, her novels occasioning rare interest amongst literary
critics and historians, rarer interest still amongst jurists. The purpose of this article is to address this
neglect, and to recommend Hays as one of the most intriguing and urgent prophets of modern literary
and jurisprudential feminism.
In the very last year of what had been a tumultuous decade, Joseph Johnson & Co. published The
Victim of Prejudice. Johnson was a notorious publisher of radical journals, and an equally notorious
patron of radical writers, young and old. Mary Wollstonecraft was a prote´ge´, her husband William
Godwin a close friend (Waters, 2004, pp. 451, 419–23). The Godwin–Johnson ‘circle’ was renowned,
to some notorious. Another member of that circle, one of Johnson’s must trusted editors, was the
author of The Victim of Prejudice, the thirty-nine-year-old Mary Hays.1 Three years earlier, in 1796,
another of Johnson’s friends, the prominent Dissenting publisher George Robinson, had published
Hays’s first novel, the Memoirs of Emma Courtney. Both novels were written to shock, and both
succeeded. The later mid-Victorian audience would cast Hays outside the margins of canonical
respectability; where she has, by and large, remained.2 A woman who had enjoyed a ‘sort of
popularity’, Henry Crabb Robinson observed on hearing of her death in 1843, but who was too
prone to ‘liberal’ opinions (Kelly, 1993, p. 264). Hays was one of those women who the Reverend
Richard Powhele had half a century earlier castigated as ‘unsex’d’, in chief part because they wrote,
not just about women and sex, but about the inadequacies and injustices of English legal and
political institutions (Ty, 1993, pp. 1–2, 13). Even the modern critic, whilst keener to reinvest Hays
in the literary feminist canon, as a pioneer indeed of a ‘politics of the personal’, tends to do so warily.3
1 Hays became a prominent figure in the Johnson ‘circle’, organisingmany of its gatherings. It is thought that it
was at one of these gatherings that Hay engineered the first meeting between Godwin andWollstonecraft in
January 1796; a striking piece of match-making. See Kelly (1993, p. 93) and Ty, (1993, pp. 5–6,) discussing
Hays’s position within the Johnson ‘circle’ and her relationship with Godwin and Wollstonecraft.
2 See Rajan (1993, pp. 149–50) for a commentary on the critical failure to appreciate the importance of Hays’s
novels, particularly their role in developing a genre of testamentary narrative.
3 See Ty (1994, p. xi), commenting on her role in fashioning this politics, and also Rogers (1987, pp. 131–32). For
an influential affirmation of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century as a critical period in the
emergence of a ‘distinctively female literary tradition’, see Gilbert and Gubar (2000, pp. xi, xxxii). See also
Butler (1981, p. 38), discussing the rise of feminist literary ‘individualism’ in the novels of the 1790s. See
Drakopoulou (2007, pp. 332–35) for a similar observation, directed more closely at the jurisprudential
implications of this supposition.
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The purpose of this article is to revisit Hays’s two novels, and to do so more particularly as an
exercise in literary jurisprudence. Both novels, as we shall see, focus on the situation of women in
late eighteenth-century England, along the way engaging a variety of social, political and legal
issues. In doing so, they present a chronicle of intrinsic historical importance. At the same time,
however, they also serve to reinvest contemporary debates which continue to oscillate around
precisely the same interests, more particularly the cultural and discursive prejudices which attach
to the situation of women in modern society. The semi-autobiographical Emma Courtney hazarded
the thought that young women had needs, emotional and sexual, and that they had a natural right
to ensure they were met.4 Victim of Prejudice, however, was altogether darker, depicting images of
rape and sexual assault, and in doing so presenting a stark and excoriating critique of the private
violence and deprivation which the public subjugation of women demanded. Two particular
passages, one in each novel, gained an immediate notoriety. Both were designed to cause an
especial consternation; and both did.
I would give myself to you
The first of these passages could be found in chapter six of the second volume of Emma Courtney,
where the eponymous heroine, despairing of her dithering paramour, and giving up on the receding
prospect of ever marrying him, declares with an alarming frankness, ‘my heart flutters – I breathe
with difficulty – My friend – I would give myself to you – the gift is not worthless’ (p. 124). What
could possibly have led a well-brought up, respectable middle-class lady to utter such a diabolical
invitation? Before we engage some of the answers to which Hays expected her horrified audience to
seek recourse, we should perhaps set the passage within its immediate context.
The Memoirs of Emma Courtney is written in the testamentary genre; a genre that had become
increasingly popular during the latter decades of the century, particularly amongst Dissenting
writers. Hays came from a large south London Dissenting community. The personal context is
thus important; even if it is, as ever, elusive. By 1782, aged just twenty-two, Hays was in regular
correspondence with Robert Robinson, the editor of the leading Dissenting journal, the Political
Catechism. By the end of the decade, she had read across the canon of late-eighteenth-century
radical Dissent, including the likes of Theophilus Lindsey, Joseph Priestley and Richard Price. The
young Hays was evidently attracted by the ‘ardour for liberty’ which the latter famously identified
in his incendiary 1790 sermon, A Discourse on the Love of Our Country, with its sure prospect of
‘the dominion of kings changed for the dominion of laws, the dominion of priests giving way to the
dominion of reason and conscience’ (Price, 1991, p. 195). Early writings, perhaps most obviously
her 1791 Cursory Remarks on an Enquiry into the Expediency and Propriety of Public or Social Worship,
evidence the depth of Hays’s commitment to an incipient politics of radical Dissent.5 The pub-
lication of her Letters and Essays two years earlier confirmed as much.6 The influence of William
Godwin, the famed philosopher of ‘rational anarchy’, and author of the vast Enquiry Concerning
Political Justice, published in 1793, was particularly important. Written as a paean to the ‘age
of reason’, and a certain belief in the equal ‘perfectibility’ of men and women, the Enquiry
4 See Ty (1996, p. xx) and also Rajan, (1993, pp. 158–60), presenting the novel as an exemplar of an emergent
romantic genre of ‘auto-narration’, in which ‘writers bring details from their personal lives into their texts,
speaking in a voice that is recognizably their own or through a persona whose relation to the biographical
author is obvious’, a ‘conscious’ and ‘specific form of self-writing’. Here, for example, Hays’s novels can be
aligned with Coleridge’s ‘conversation poems’.
5 The essay was written in defence of public worship, and as a repost to Gilbert Wakefield’s critique of
communal prayer.
6 Letters and Essayswas published as co-authored by Hays and her sister. But it is generally assumed that Mary
was responsible for most, if not all, of it.
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recommended a ‘species of liberty’ that was as horrifying for its espousal of principles of democracy
as it was for its libertarianism.7
Hays was an ardent admirer of Godwin’s, confessing in an early correspondence that his novel
Caleb Williams had ‘excited in my own mind a sensibility almost convulsive’.8 The intellectual heart
of Emma Courtney was to be written around this correspondence; recast as the epistolary narrative
which develops between Emma and her mentor Mr Francis. The third figure in this testamentary
menage a` trois was also based on a real figure in the life of the young Mary Hays; William Frend, the
Cambridge mathematician to whom she had confessed her affections, but who had proved to be
maddeningly non-committal. Mary Hays was writing from the heart, expressing her innermost
feeling and frustrations, and she wanted her readers, particularly those closest to her, to appreciate
the fact. Frend was Harley, just as Godwin was Francis, and Hays was Emma. As she advised her own
dithering paramour, EmmaCourtneywaswritten as a ‘confession’, to ‘engagemymind, to sluice off its
impressions’ (Kelly, 1993, p. 93). When Godwin, whilst praising the ‘energy of feeling’ in the novel,
observed that the plot seemed implausible, Hays responded ‘my story is too real’, the expressions of
sexual frustration ‘proof of a lively and strong imagination, of a sanguine, an enterprising, an ardent,
an unconquerable spirit’ (Kelly, 1993, pp. 94–95). Anything Emma Courtney felt, or expressed, was
felt and expressed by Mary Hays (Todd, 1989, p. 237: Rogers, 1987, p. 140).
Such an affirmation was not calculated to reassure her larger audience. And neither was the
context within which Hays has her breathless heroine offer her ‘gift’. The ‘prejudice’ of ‘custom and
prescription’, more precisely the ‘cruel’ conditions of a ‘capricious testator’, precludes the possibility
of marriage to Harley (pp. 52, 79-80).9 Emma was fully aware that the institution of marriage, as her
guardian had advised, ‘must of necessity’ be primarily ‘an affair of finance’ (p. 30). But she is not
cowed. ‘It is a pernicious system of morals which teaches us that hypocrisy can be virtue’, that the
institution of marriage should be servant to the laws of property rather than those of the ‘human
heart’ (p. 79). As any disciple of Godwin’s Enquiry knew, the tyranny of ‘positive law’ is necessarily ‘an
evil, an usurpation upon the private judgement and individual conscience ofmankind’, and it behove
all ‘friends of reason and the human species, to admit as little of it as possible’ (Godwin, 1985, pp. 206,
379). Emma Courtney did; in the offering of her chastity to the terminally indecisive Harley, making
a gesture that was intended to be every bit as revolutionary as any of the fantastical images of bestial
femininity conjured by Edmund Burke his Reflections on the Revolution in France. It was indeed a
gesture which, as Emma confesses, ‘made me almost criminal in my own eyes’ (p. 135).
There were few images better calculated to disturb than that of the sexually assertive woman. As
Martin Wiener (2004, pp. 30–31) confirms, the readership of 1790s England was seduced by a
peculiarly virulent ‘sex panic’. Sex, it seemed, was everywhere; in novels, in newspapers, in the
7 See Godwin (1985, p. 28), affirming that there ‘is no characteristic of man, which seems at present at least
eminently to distinguish him, or to be of so much importance in every branch of moral science, as his
perfectibility’. The idea that reason ensured a common ‘perfectibility’ was popular. In his Fragment on
Government, Bentham (1988, p. 3) observed, ‘The age we live in is a busy age; in which knowledge is rapidly
advancing towards perfection’.
8 And asking for a free copy of his Enquiry. Godwin, famously generous and famously susceptible to flattery,
happily agreed to the request. The Enquiry was priced at an exorbitant £1.16s; something which made its
publishing success evenmore remarkable. On approaching Godwin, Hays further remarked that she had read
a favourable review of the Enquiry in the Analytical Review which had made her still keener to access a copy.
For a discussion of the Hays–Godwin correspondence, see Luria, (1977, pp. 526), noting the former’s particular
acknowledgment of the latter as her ‘tutelary genius’.
9 Having abandoned the practice of law, due to his disgust at its ‘chicanery’, Harley is dependent on an
inheritance of £400 a year from a distant relative, which is conditional on his marrying on certain stipulated
terms. Under the circumstance, Harley is only inclined to marry if his prospective wife has the financial
capacity to compensate him for the loss of this bequest. The existence of such settlements, importing various
constraints on the marital prospects of future generations in the form of ‘restraints in anticipation’, was
certainly not uncommon (Holcombe, 1983, pp. 9–13).
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drawing rooms of middle England. Conservative journals such as the Critical Review and the
Anti-Jacobin sought comfort in various misogynist mythologies, supposing that such sexuality was
the preserve of the working class, of the neurotic and the mad, insinuating a necessary affinity
between adultery and prostitution (Ty, 1993, pp. 19–20; Clark, 1987, pp. 76–83). In time, feminism
would become aligned in the pejorative imagination with ‘hysterical’ sexuality, prostitution, illegi-
timacy. It was not simply that impassioned women were hysterical or mad, resonant in the popular
imagination of the rampaging harridans raised by Burke or successive editors of the Anti-Jacobin.
There was something else, every bit as troubling. The stability of middle England was grounded
on sexual propriety, the confident assumption that virtuous wives bred legitimate children. But that
confidence was eroding, and fast (Kelly, 1993, pp. 5–6; Vickery, 2003, pp. 39–40, 282–83, 288).
So what could possibly have driven Hays to confess, through her protagonist, a willingness to
prostitute herself to such base lust? Her affinity with the Godwinians was of course suggestive. But
it was barely sufficient a reason for such an exceptional statement. The answer, or somany supposed,
was reading. The ‘learned lady’ was subject to a particularly venomous ridicule (Kelly, 1993,
pp. 176–77). It is clear that Mary Hays was encouraged to read widely from a young age, developing
a particular passion for protestant theology, science and the classics (Luria, 1977, p. 524). And so is
Emma Courtney. The young Emma develops an ‘avidity for books’, liberated by ‘ten to fourteen
novels a week’, together with a steadying diet of Plutarch, Descartes and various other studies of
‘high-toned philosophy’ and ‘republican ardour’. Rather less steadying, of course, was the inevitable
encounter with Rousseau. Emma, needless to say, was thrilled by La Nouvelle Heloise, leaving an
‘impression made on my mind which was never to be effaced’, and producing ‘a long chain of
consequences, that will continue to operate till the day of my death’ (pp. 25–26).10
It was precisely these kinds of consequences that so many found so troubling. The thought that
precisely such women as Emma Courtney, overfed on a rich diet of Rousseau and Godwin, were
in fact passing their spare time, not just thrilling at stories of adultery and seduction, but also
partaking in the same, was no less horrifying than the prospect of Burke’s harridans paddling
across the Channel (Binhammer, 2003, pp. 1–2). The dissipation of the female mind began in the
pages of novels such as Heloise. It was not simply that reading novels suggested a certain domestic
negligence, as James Fordyce had supposed in his bestselling Sermons to YoungWomen (Kelly, 1993,
pp. 11–12). There was a deeper moral anxiety. As a 1792 pamphlet entitled the Evils of Adultery and
Prostitution foretold, ‘The increase of novels will help to account for the increase in prostitution and
for the numerous adulteries and elopements that we hear of in the different parts of the kingdom
(Binhammer, 2003, p. 1). Indeed, as an incipient medico-legal jurisprudence would come to
insinuate, reading novels like Heloise could eventually make women mad (Gilbert and Gubar,
2000, pp. 55–56).
Hays was, however, undaunted, repeatedly advising in essays and correspondence that books
were a vital strategic resource for the emancipation of the female mind; provided of course such
minds were properly counselled.11 Hays was fully in tune with the supposition, articulated in Mary
Wollstonecraft’s Vindication of the Rights of Women, that female liberation must be an educated
liberation; for ‘we are all the creatures of education’ (Hays, 1996, p. 8). In her Appeal to the Men of
Great Britain on Behalf of Women, published in 1798, Hays confirmed that the ‘regulation of the
conduct of women’ was rooted in the constraints of an education which was dedicated to ‘degrading
10 For a discussion regarding the balance, or perhaps imbalance, in Emma’s early reading, and the conse-
quences which, Hays insinuates, this may have had upon her later life experiences, see Binhammer (2003,
pp. 7–10). Emma, the reader is led to believe, is rather too fond of novels, to the ultimate neglect of more
sober texts. A little more Descartes, and a little less Rousseau, and things might have turned out differently.
11 See her comments in Letters and Essays, and also in a contribution to the Monthly Magazine rather later in
1797 (Hays, 1994, pp. 236–44).
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our understandings’.12 Emma is constantly frustrated by a prejudice that is at once cultural and
intellectual: ‘Why have I been rendered feeble and delicate by bodily constraint and fastidious by
artificial refinement? Why do we suffer ourselves to be confined within a magic circle, without
daring, by a magnanimous effort, to dissolve the barbarous spell?’ (p. 32) Little wonder that Emma
Courtney bemoans the fact that ‘I feel that I am neither a philosopher nor a heroine, but a woman to
whom education has given sexual character’ (p. 117).
The strategic use of literature, particularly romance literature, imported certain ambiguities; as
Mary Hays was well aware. One was the counter that such literature was simply trite; the mere
expression, as Emma Courtney confesses in a melancholy moment, of a ‘nature’ that is ‘peculiarly
susceptible to the tender affections’ (p. 89). In the Preface to Emma Courtney Hays was keen to
distinguish her novel from those ‘hackneyed’ depictions of romance characteristic of so many
eighteenth-century novels. Emma Courtney, she averred, would instead present the testament of ‘a
human being, loving virtue while enslaved by passion, liable to the mistakes and weaknesses of
our fragile nature’ (pp. 3–4). Mary Hays was certainly not alone amongst Radical Dissenters in
wanting to distinguish an affinity with the ‘cult of sensibility’; and there was nothing peculiar in
critics seizing on precisely the same affinity. It was, these critics rejoined, women who read novels
such as La Nouvelle Heloise who ended up offering themselves to impressionable young men like
Augustus Harley (Luria, 1977, p. 525). In time, Hays found herself caricatured as little more than a
literary pimp, the fate of her heroines a salutary warning as to whatmight happen to young girls who
read too much.13 We shall revisit the ‘cult of sensibility’ in due course; for it carries a particular
resonance with modern invocations of a jurisprudence of ‘poethics’.
A testament like Emma Courtney is not then just a confession. It is also a polemic; one which
incorporated a plea, not just for educational emancipation, but for a broader despatch of cultural and
political prejudice. As Emma declares, ‘modified by circumstances, the customs of society, then, have
enslaved, enervated, and degraded women’ (p. 39).14 The subjugation of women is socially con-
structed and can be ‘traced to the vices and errors of institutions’ (p. 49). A closer, more urgent,
critique of legal and political institutions would appear in Hays’s second novel. But it makes a
formative appearance in Emma Courtney, especially on the slightly breathless, rather Gothic closing
chapters, in which the rejected Emma first falls ill, ‘poisoned’ by the ‘constitutions of society’, then
marries the odious Montague, who proves to be an incipient wife-beater, adulterer and child
murderer, and who eventually commits suicide, and then encounters a dying Harley, who confesses
his love, and leaves her his young son Augustus, whom she adopts (pp. 170, 181–85, 189–91, 195).
Finally, Emma emerges, if not unscathed, at least, having inherited Montague’s fortune, con-
siderably richer as well as wiser. The institutional roots of cultural prejudice, principally the
‘chicanery’ of the law and the ‘hypocrisy and usurpation’ of the established Church, both as likely
to ‘check the freedom, and contaminate the purity, of the mind, and, entangling it in an explicable
maze of error, poison virtue at its source’, have been uncovered (p. 193). In time, such institutions,
and such hypocrisy, will be overcome; but not yet. If Emma’s generation has begun the revolution, it
will be for little Augustus’s generation to complete it (Rajan, 1993, pp. 173–74). Hers has been a
‘moral martyrdom’, of the kind endured by a revolutionary vanguard which ‘daring to trace, to their
12 And further echoing Wollstonecraft in regretting that so ‘many a good head is stuffed with ribbons, gauze,
fringes, flounces and furblows, that might have received and communicated, far other and more noble
impressions’ (Hays, 1994, p. 228). See Ty (1993, p. 48), quoting Hay’s further plea in her Appeal, ‘why should
women be excluded from having, and giving their opinions, upon matters of importance to themselves?’.
13 Most notoriously in Charles Lloyd’s Edmund Oliver and perhaps most cruelly as the absurd Bridgetina
Botherin in Elizabeth Hamilton’s Memoirs of Modern Philosophers.
14 Hays would deploy the same slavery image in herAppeal to theMen of Great Britain in Behalf ofWomen in 1798
(Ty, 1993, p. 47).
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springs, errors the most hoary, and prejudices the most venerated, emancipate the human mind from
the trammels of superstition, and teach it, that its true dignity and virtue, consist in being free’
(pp. 195–96). Little wonder that Godwin, an indomitable optimist, the famed philosopher of ‘perfect-
ibility’, applauded the conclusion (Kelly, 1993, pp. 105–106). Little wonder, too, that others did not.
I suffered a brutal violation
So, in the fourth chapter of the second book of The Victim of Prejudice, Mary Raymond describes her
brutal fate at the hands of her assailant, Sir Phillip Osborne, rapist, child molester and scion of the
English aristocracy (p. 117). It was a declaration intended to shock every bit as much as Emma
Courtney’s rather more breathless invitation to unwedded fornication. But there was one very
obvious difference between the two equally notorious passages. Emma wanted sex. Mary
Raymond did not. There may have only been three years between the publication of Mary Hays’s
first novel and her second. But, in terms of tone, they are light years apart. Emma Courtney andMary
Raymond inhabited very different literary landscapes (Ty, 1993, pp. 59–61; Sherman, 1997, p. 143).
Critical reception of such an ‘uncommon book’, as Robert Southey reported of Emma Courtney
had been variable; ‘much praised and much abused’, but almost uniformly identified as being rather
too ‘Godwinite’ (Luria, 1977, p. 527; Kelly, 1993, p. 110). Plainly written by an author whose ‘head
seems to be full of the sophistries’ of Rousseau and Godwin ‘and writers of that class’, the Analytical
Review observed (Kelly, 1993, p. 108; Binhammer, 2003, pp. 2–3; Ty, 1999, p. 135). It was thought by
many that the relationships depicted in Emma Courtney presented a verbatim testament to the
depravities of the Godwin–Johnson circle; a supposition which imported the titillating supposition
that their relations were as much about satisfying base lust as contemplating metaphysical wonder
or political revolution. Not that Hays again seemed unduly daunted, as a series of letters to the
MonthlyMagazine, in which she sought to defend her novel, confirmed. The time had comewhen the
fanciful myths of ‘chivalry’, which exist primarily to justify the ‘deeply entangled’ injustices of
‘property’, should be replaced by harsher depictions of the real ‘tyranny’ of female subjugation (Kelly,
1993, pp. 108–109). The same alignment, of cultural and jurisprudential tyranny, was reiterated in
her Appeal to the Men of Great Britain, published the year before Victim of Prejudice, but in large part
composed alongside; the injustice of ‘their laws’ masked by the associated mythologies of ‘female
virtue’ (Kelly, 1993, pp. 113–15). Not just undaunted, it seemed; more determined still.
Victim of Prejudice is again written in testamentary form, opening reflectively in media res.15
Injustice has already been wrought. The present has been overcome by the past. The fate of Mary
Raymond, as will become graphically apparent, is preordained; destined to be raped, abused, con-
strained, incarcerated. Presently ‘immured in the gloomy walls of a prison’, Mary addresses her
prospective audience in terms of their putative and shared subjugation, ‘victim of despotism,
oppression, or error, tenant of a dungeon, and successor to its present devoted inhabitant . . .whose
unconquerable spirit, bowed but not broken, seeks to beguile, by the retrospect of an unsullied life,
the short interval, to which will succeed a welcome and never-ending repose’ (pp. ii–iii).
The opening images, recounting her orphaned childhood in the care of Mr Raymond, who in
echo of Emma’s Mr Francis, ‘cherished notions somewhat singular respecting female accomplish-
ments’, her development into a ‘vivacious and sparkling’ young woman with a ‘mind inquisitive’
and then her sojourn in the household of the benign curate Mr Neville, are quickly overshadowed
by darker presences, foremost amongst whom is Osborne (p. 5). From the very outset, Osborne is
attracted by the sexuality of his young prey, and the thrill of scheming her fall; a ‘true daughter of
Eve’, he leers when he first encounters the twelve-year-old Mary (p. 14). Next time they meet, in a
15 Openings in media res were common to the confessional genre of Jacobin literature.
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passage redolent with sado-masochistic imagery, Mary is subject to the ‘discipline’ of Osborne’s whip,
groped and then kissed with an ‘odious violence’ (pp. 21–22). Her horrified guardian, fearing that in
‘cultivating my mind, in fostering a virtuous sensibility, in imbuing my heart with principles of
justice and rectitude, he had not been betraying my happiness’ hastily sends Mary away (pp. 30–31).
But not far enough. For like all Gothic anti-heroes, Osborne proves to be demonically prescient,
forever popping up when his victim is feeling most alienated and most vulnerable. It is an inebriated
Osborne, predictably enough, who rescues Mary from the rising tide shortly after she arrives at the
home of Mr Neville, another benign Godwinian who seems unable to protect her from ‘resistless
prejudice’ (p. 41). Osborne, equally predictably, then embarks upon a concerted strategy of stalking
his prey around the village, with a ‘disgusting audacity’ (pp. 51, 96). When Mr Raymond dies,
Osborne offers to keep Mary in his London home, as his mistress. It is when Mary refuses that she
finds herself incarcerated in his bedroom, forced to witnesses evenings of ‘Bacchanalian’ excess, and
eventually, ‘in terror’, raped (pp. 113–15).
Depictions of rape were not uncommon in eighteenth-century literature, and neither were
aristocratic rapists. Richardson, whose Clarissa dominated the generic literary landscape, famously
eschewed physical depiction.16 Hays was not so coy (Ty, 1993, pp. 65–6). ‘Why should we seek to
deceive?’ she asked in her essay On Novel Writing. ‘Why should we not’ instead, ‘paint’ the terror as it
is really experienced, ‘mingled with imperfection, and discoloured by passion?’ (Ty, 1993, p. 65). The
rape of Mary Raymond, and more particularly still the ensuing evocation of feelings of horror and
self-loathing, are unsparing. Most stark, however, is the dawning sense of impotence and abandon-
ment; the realisation that against the prejudice of society and its legal institutions, and against the
crushing contempt of her violator, Mary is powerless. Osborne later ventures a half-hearted apology,
explaining that he might have drunk a little too much, and that she should not take things too
seriously. In reply Mary asserts her dignity, articulates her anger, and reveals the depths of her
naivety:
‘I demand my liberty this moment; I insist upon being suffered to depart. No one has a right to
control me. I will appeal to the tribunal of my country; I will boldly claim the protection of its
laws, to which though art already amenable.’ (p. 117)
Osborne merely laughs at such ‘romantic lamentations’:
‘What testimony or witness can you produce that will not make against you? Where are your
resources to sustain the vexations and delay of a law suit, which you so wildly threaten?
Who would support you against my wealth and influence? How would your delicacy shrink
from the idea of becoming, in open court, the sport of ribaldry, the theme of obscene jesters?’
(pp. 118–19)17
Haunted by the ‘visionary’ spectre of her mother, a horrified Mary just ‘shuddered, groaned’ (pp. 119,
123). Her fate had indeed been foretold. Shortly before her own rape, Mary had received her mother’s
16 Richardson was particularly revered by Hays. Ty (1993, p. 65) argues that in writing about Mary’s violent
seduction Hays was ‘rewriting’ Richardson’s Clarissa ‘from a feminist perspective’. See also Clark (1987,
pp. 21–24) on the tendency of contemporary authors to evade overt descriptions of sexual violence.
17 Osborne, of course, has every right to be contemptuous. Eighteenth-century courts were invariably sceptical
of rape claimants. In his 1731 play Rape Upon Rape, Henry Fielding categorised such claimants as inveterate
blackmailers. The prospect of Mary securing an indictment, never mind a conviction, was virtually zero; as
rape and conviction statistics from the period evidence (Wiener, 2004, pp. 76–77; Clark, 1987, pp. 46–54).
The situation, of course, is little changed today. Accusations of rape, as Joanna Burke (2007, pp. 391–98) has
recently affirmed, are still commonly met with an innate scepticism, whilst the ‘attrition rate’, exacerbated
by the daunting nature of legal proceedings, at least for rape victims, reduces the ratio of successful
prosecutions to around 5 percent. It can be reasonably supposed that Osborne would be as likely to get
away with raping Mary Raymond today, as he was in 1799.
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posthumous testament of violence and violation. Written from prison as she awaits her own
inevitable fate, it tells of her destruction, overcome by the ‘revel of an hour’, duly ‘branded with
infamy’, abandoned to a life of dissipation and prostitution (pp. 60, 63).18 The testament is written to
advise, not just ‘to contemn the tyranny that would impose fetters of sex upon her mind’, but also to
counsel Mary against falling victim to the same fate (p. 69). And the same prejudices, for it is against
these that the young Mary must, most urgently, set her guard:
‘[B]y enlarging the circle of my observation though in the bosom of my depravity, my under-
standing became enlightened: I perceived myself the victim of injustice, of the prejudice, of
society, which by opposing to my return to virtue almost insuperable barriers, had plunged me
into irremediable ruin.’ (p. 66)
Above all there is jurisprudential prejudice, the embedded, institutional prejudice of the law:
‘Law completes the triumph of injustice. The despotism of man rendered me weak, his vices
betrayed me into shame, a barbarous policy stifled returning dignity, prejudice robbed me of the
means of independence, gratitude ensnared me in the devices of treachery, the contagion of
example corrupted my heart, despair hardened and brutality rendered it cruel. A sanguinary
policy precludes reformation, defeating the dear-bought lessons of experience, and, by a legal
process, assuming the arm of omnipotence, annihilates the being whom its negligence left
destitute, and its institutions compelled to offend.’ (p. 68)
But as she reads the testament, the young Mary realises, not just the intractability of her fate, but its
consequence. She is not merely orphaned, but illegitimate. As Mr Raymond confirms, ‘In the eye of
the world, the misfortunes of your birth stain your unsullied youth’. A ‘shuddering horror crept
through my heart’, she recalls, imagining her mother’s fate, and anticipating her own (p. 72). And
justifiably. As Hays (1994, p. 232) observed in her Letters and Essays, ‘young women without fortunes,
if they do not chance to marry . . .have scarce any other resource than in servitude or prostitution’.
The young Mary had harboured hopes of marriage to another of Mr Raymond’s wards, William
Pelham, whose principle function in the novel is the same as that of Augustus Harley in Emma
Courtney; to crush these hopes. Orphans rarely marry well, unless they have large inheritances.
Bastards more rarely still. It is not, as Mr Raymond soberly advises, what marriage is for (pp. 32, 36,
55). And it not just this hope that is crushed. Mary must also reconcile herself to a public prejudice
which will assume that sexual depravity runs in her blood. Her fate is set.
Where the final passages of Emma Courtney had assumed a lighter Gothic tone, of various
misfortunes attended, and in time ameliorated, Victim of Prejudice progresses inexorably to a closure
of unremitting misery and injustice. There will be no happy endings. Hounded by Osborne’s
calumnies, shunned by society, Mary falls ever further into ‘deplorable destitution’, constantly
harassed by employers who presume that she will indulge their every sexual whim, and assaulted
when she does not (pp. 139–40, 142).19 Incarcerated in a debtor’s gaol, Mary wonders ‘For what crime
was I driven from society?’ (p. 141). With a sense of grim inevitability, Osborne pops up to reiterate
an offer of marriage, a ‘legal settlement’ which might save Mary from the more ‘loathsome’ aspect of
the ‘law’. Rejected, he leaves his ‘victim’ to her ‘romantic whims’ (pp. 15–16). After a brief interlude
during which she is bailed by Mr Raymond’s old servant, the indebted Mary is driven back to gaol,
pursued by ‘the bigotry of prejudice, the virulence of envy, the spleen and the corruption engendered
18 The narrative relates how Mr Raymond, a former and frustrated suitor, had after many years encountered
Mary’s mother in her fallen state, ‘disordered by recent inebriation, disfigured by vice, worn by disease’, and
accused of murder.
19 See Rogers (1987, pp. 134–35) and Clark (1987, pp. 104–108) on the reality of master–servant rape, the
cultural pejorative which assumed that such events represented a lesser form of assault.
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in the humanmind by barbarous institutions and pernicious habits’ (p. 163).20Osborne reiterates his
offer of marriage, suggesting that she would lose nothing by allowing him to complement the moral
‘title’ he has to her body with a ‘legal’ one (p. 164). Mary again declines: ‘I sink beneath a torrent,
whose resistless waves overwhelm alike in a common ruin the guiltless and the guilty’ (p. 168).
The subjugation ofMary Raymond is inexorable and brutal, borne of a consuming need to engage
the real horrors suffered by real women in late-eighteenth-century England. Eighteenth-century
literature was, of course, suffused with Mary Raymonds, some raped, most deceived, all fated by the
pretences of morality and the harder demands of the ‘system of property’, as Hays (1994 p. 234) put it,
to suffer the inevitable consequences. A few days after her rape, Mary encountersWilliam Pelham on
the street. On hearing her misfortune, he likewise offers to keep her as his mistress; ‘all that’ now ‘can
be reasonably demanded’ (p. 127). ‘Thy destiny’, her erstwhile lover observes, on parting, ‘is indeed
severe’ (p. 129). Amidst the myriad pressing anxieties of sexual excess and moral degeneracy, the
consequences of illegitimacy, and the spread of disease and criminality, the distinction between the
victim of rape and the victim of seduction tended to be fine. Moreover, an incipient medico-legal
culture was alreadyminded to assume that somewomenwere destined to fall, not because they were
unfortunate enough to encounter an Osborne, but because they were genetically, and culturally,
predisposed to do so.21 Obsessed by her mother’s mental frailty, Mary Raymond increasingly
comprehends her fate in precisely these terms.
Hays, however, was not so easily persuaded. For her the reasons are at once more varied andmore
prosaic, and for the modern reader accordingly rather more familiar too. Most importantly, andmost
urgently, Mary’s mother has nomoney, and thus no choice; a misfortune recognised in the establish-
ment, most commonly by Dissenting congregations, of numerous ‘magdalene hospitals’ and ‘found-
ling homes’. Women prostitute themselves in order to eat; a logic which men culturally inscribe and
legally proscribe, and then gleefully exploit. Part of the cultural inscription, moreover, is the pretence
of horror; the hypocrisies of which Hays identifies in her ‘Advertisement to the Reader’ at the outset
of Victim of Prejudice, in which she unmasks ‘the mischiefs which have ensued from the too-great
stress laid on the reputation for chastity in women’. It is the ‘voluptuousness’ of men, and the
‘baneful tendencies’ of their insatiable appetites which has for centuries demanded the ‘sacrifice of
hetacombs of victims’ (pp. 1–2).
Associated myths are duly cast down. Mary Raymond falls from on high. She may have been an
illegitimate orphan, the daughter of a prostitute and a murderer, but she was also a member, albeit
adoptive, of the landed gentry. She should have been safer than most. Except, of course, that few
women are ever really safe, even middle-class ones. Her rapist, furthermore, is a scion of the
aristocracy; a common trope in seducer fiction, and one which gestured to a larger debate regarding
the seeming inadequacies of the English ruling classes (Kelly, 1993, p. 168; Maasen, 1999, pp. 175, 178,
183). Montague in Emma Courtney had aristocratic pretensions. But Osborne, in his strategic menda-
city as well as his vaunting arrogance and physical violence, is an altogether more convincing and
frightening variant of the species. All men are capable of rape, all women of being raped.
And violence can be inflicted anywhere. The patriarchal literary tradition was intended to
somehow naturalise female subordination, in return conveying not just a quality of virtue to those
who accepted their condition, but the reassurance of a benign domestic tyranny. The woman who
20 As fate would have it, Osborne discovers thatMary has been bailed by old James. As fate would also have it, it
further transpires that Osborne is James’s landlord. When James discovers Mary’s history, he is so appalled
that he immediately suffers a stroke and falls over dead.
21 The literature here is, of course, considerable. See Matus, (1995, pp. 21–49), Drakopoulou (2007, pp. 343–45),
Clark (1987, pp. 59–65) and also more broadly, discussing the constitutive role of associated discourses of
medical jurisprudence in the shaping and re-shaping the early-nineteenth-century family, Suzuki (2006,
pp. 1–11).
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submits to marriage and who therefore resigns herself to a private life is not only virtuous, but safe.
As John Ruskin sought to maintain, even a century on, the ‘home’ must always be ‘the place of Peace;
the shelter, not only from all injury, but from all terror, doubt and division’ (Shanley, 1989, p. 191).
The insinuation was patent. A virtuous woman stays at home. A woman who steps outside alone
takes her chances, abroad in a public world in which sexuality is promiscuous and violence endemic.
Emma Courtney took her chances, and by and large got away with it. Mary Raymond does not. And
there is a collateral, if marginally countervailing, insinuation. It is not just that Hays’s protagonists
are inclined to take their chances. It is also that there is nothing intrinsically safe about the English
hearth or, as Mary Raymond discovers, the English bedroom; quite the contrary.22 The idea that
public depravity began in the home, particularly in the homes of alcoholic men, once again found a
strong echo in Dissenting temperance literature. Hays had already adopted this very line in her
Appeal (Rogers, 1987, p. 133). Sexual violence is inflicted everywhere, and suffered everywhere.
In the final passages of the novel, as death approaches, Mary composes her own testament, one
that echoes almost allusion by allusion that she had received from her own mother:
‘The victim of a barbarous prejudice, society has cast me out from its bosom. The sensibilities of
my heart have been turned to bitterness, the powers ofmymindwasted, my projects abortive, my
virtues and my sufferings alike unrewarded, I have lived in vain! Unless the story of my sorrows
should kindle in the heart of man, in behalf of my oppressed sex, the sacred claims of humanity
and justice . . . Ignorance and despotism, combating frailty with cruelty, may go on to propose
partial reform in one invariable, melancholy round; reason derides weak effort; while the fabric
of superstition and crime, extending its broad base, mocks the toil of the visionary projector.’
(pp. 174–75)
Three years earlier, as she completed the final drafts of Emma Courtney, Hays could dream of happier
endings. No longer.
I have deserved a better fate
In a letter of 1804, written to Henry Crabb Robinson, Hays confessed:
‘Mine has been a singular and romantic life, its incidents arising out of a singular and romantic
mind. I am not suited to the times and persons among which I have fallen, and I will say – that I
have deserved a better fate.’ (Ty, 1996, p. xxxvii)
She was, of course, still only forty-four. Half her life remained to be lived. And she was not finished
with writing. In time she would turn to children’s writing, to instructive manuals on education and
morals, to grand histories of English Queens.23And there would be occasional pamphlets on political
matters, questions of social justice, the condition of the ‘labouring poor’, and a couple more novels:
The Brothers, published in 1815, and Family Annals: or the Sisters, published two years later, both of
22 A fact which was only slowly recognised in the courtroom. For a discussion of gradually changing judicial
attitudes to domestic violence during the period, see King (1996, pp. 47, 49–50, 59–60) and also Clark (1987,
pp. 110–27).
23 Hays wrote copiously and widely in the decades following the turn of the century. Aside from her two
didactic novels, she contributed a biography of Wollstonecraft to Richard Phillip’s The Annual Necrology, for
1798–9, numerous instruction manuals and histories for children, including Historical Dialogues for Young
Persons, and assorted studies of renowned women, most obviously her Female Biography; or Memoirs of
Illustrious and Celebrated Women, of All Ages and Countries published in 1803, and her laterMemoirs of Queens,
published eighteen years later. The latter was written to exploit public interest in the Queen Caroline ‘affair’.
Taking Caroline’s side, Hays presented her as the victim of a patriarchal culture of monarchy which
determined to besmirch the reputation of someone who challenged its authority.
ian ward140
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 21 Jul 2011 IP address: 128.240.229.67
which were essentially didactic and written to reaffirm a commitment to a revitalised early-
nineteenth-century evangelicalism. But by the end of the 1790s, Hays, like Godwin, and like most
of her generation, knew the radical moment had passed.
Critics had found Emma Courtney troubling enough. Victim of Prejudice caused even greater
consternation. Written in ‘a manner highly dangerous to the peace and welfare of society’, the
appalled reviewer in the Critical Review soberly advised, an expression of ‘splenetic irritability’
plainly intended to ‘nourish the contagious and consuming fever of perverted sensibility’. There
was nothing to be gained, it counselled, and much to be lost, in the promotion of ‘indiscriminate
imputations on society and the laws’. The sorry fate of the heroine, readers of the Review were
assured, was ‘very uncommon‘, the ‘offspring’ of a hysterical authorial ‘imagination’ (Hays, 1994,
pp. 253–55). The novel could, theAnti-Jacobin Review agreed, ‘excite no sentiment but disgust’. If there
was any ‘prejudice’ abroad, it could be traced to uppity women reading too many fanciful novels
(Hays, 1994, pp. 253–55). It must, the reviewer concluded, be questioned whether:
‘it is most for the advantage of society that women should be brought up as to make them dutiful
daughters, affectionate wives, tender mothers, and good Christians, or, by a corrupt and vicious
system of education, fit them for revolutionary agents, for heroines, for Staels, for Talliens, for
Stones, setting aside all decencies, the softness, the gentleness, of the female character, and
enjoying indiscriminately every envied privilege of man?’ (Kelly, 1993, p. 125)24
Hays cannot have been surprised that the ‘cry of slander’ went up. And she was, again, seemingly
undaunted. She wanted to impugn society and its laws. This much had been affirmed in her Appeal,
in which, against the fanciful ideas of chivalric ‘justice’, she castigated a jurisprudence which was
written by men for men, exclusively for ‘their own conveniency, comfort and dignity’ (Ty, 1993,
pp. 62–63; Sherman, 1997, p. 151). Adopting the architectural metaphor preferred by jurists such as
Blackstone and Burke, she observed of this jurisprudence:
‘[T]hey look upon it as probably the wisest, and as certainly the easiest method for themselves, to
let remain as long as it can, a fabric; which though from the beginning not built of the best
materials, and certainly upon the very worst possible foundations; and which though propped
up . . . by trash, and rubbish of every sort, that best suited the conveniency of successive under-
takers; yet accommodates one way or other all parties – but particularly well, those who only
have it in their power to make a change.’ (Rogers, 1987, p. 139)
But if Hays was undaunted, others were not. The mood was turning. By the close of the decade
England was possessed by a virulent anti-radical backlash, one which had mutated into a still more
virulent anti-feminist backlash. The publication of Godwin’s adoring Memoirs of the Author of the
Vindication of the Rights of Women, written in the months following his wife’s death in 1797, with its
vivid description of suicide attempts, depression and illegitimate children, merely served to confirm
the associated prejudices of the conservative press. With Wollstonecraft dead, furthermore, critical
ire focused all the more on her chief ‘subaltern’, Mary Hays (Kelly, 1993, p. 90).
Fame is fickle; and Hays fell out of the literary firmament, her role in the composition of an
incipient literature of ‘feminist individualism’ the subject of judicious neglect (Butler, 1981, p. 38).
Two centuries on, however, Hay’s critique of social and legal prejudice has a renewed resonance for
those who embrace the particular insights of a distinctively literary jurisprudence. It has, for one, a
resonance with those like MelanieWilliams (2002, pp. xxiv, 179) and Nicola Lacey (2008, pp. 30–37),
who recommend such a jurisprudence for its peculiar ability to trace the critical ‘collision between
the feminine subject’ and the ‘judicial construction of her’. It has, further, a resonance with those
24 The references are to female literary beˆte noires of the Anti-Jacobin, Mme de Stael, Mme Talliens and Helen
Maria Williams.
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such as RichardWeisberg (1992, p. 46) who advise a deeper ethical, indeed ‘poethical’ merit in such a
jurisprudence; one that might ‘revitalize the ethical component of law’. Poethical jurisprudence has
certainly found favour amongst a number of feminist legal and literary scholars (Aristodemou, 2000,
p. 295; West, 1997, pp. 184–88, 207–215; Ward, 1995, pp. 124–28). Speaking again to a broader
disciplinary ambition, Martha Nussbaum (1995, pp. 73–78, 90–91, 115–20) recommends a ‘poetic’
jurisprudence that is more closely shaped by ‘imagination, inclusion, sympathy and voice’. The
primary responsibility of the literate jurist, she affirms, is not to write about law so much as to
nurture the critical ‘narrative imagination’, to nurture an ‘ability to think what it might be like to be
in the shoes of a person different to oneself, to be an intelligent reader of that person’s story, and to
understand the emotions and wishes and desires that someone so placed might have’ (Nussbaum,
1997, pp. 10–11).
This, it can be argued, is precisely what Mary Hays sought to do. It was, indeed, a primary
aspiration of any late-eighteenth-century writer who identified themselves with the poetic injunc-
tions of the ‘cult of sensibility’. We have already noted the extent to which Hays proclaimed this
affinity most especially in Emma Courtney. Indeed much of the epistolary narrative in the novel
moved around a continuing debate between Emma and her mentor as to the proper means of writing
such a poetic, of accommodating ‘impetuous emotions’ within a philosophy properly framed by the
faculties of reason and sensibility (p. 142). The importance of realising this accommodation was, of
course, a defining theme in Godwin’s Enquiry. The extended Preface to the second 1796 edition
confirmed that the ‘sense’ of ‘passion is so far from being incompatible with reason, that it is
inseparable from it’ (Godwin, 1985, p. 9).
Hays had already proclaimed her affinity with a politics of ‘enthusiasm’ in Letters and Essays
(Kelly, 1993, pp. 85–86; Sherman, 1997, pp. 149–50). ‘How impotent is mere reasoning against
reiterated passion’ she declaimed to Godwin in correspondence, ‘What are passions, but another
name for powers?’ (Kelly, 1993, p. 92). The same sentiment is articulated in the opening epistle of
Emma Courtney, written by Emma to her son:
‘Rouse the noble energies of your mind; be not the slave of your passions, neither dream of
eradicating them. Sensation generates interest, interest passion, passion for attention, attention
supplies the powers, and affords the means of attaining its end.’ (p. 8)
There can be, as Wollstonecraft had advised, no revolutionary politics without a revolutionary
passion. When she was invited to contribute pieces of literary criticism to journals such as the
Analytical Review and the Critical Review, Hays was not simply tasked with commenting on the
syntactical merits of sentimental novels read by sentimental women. She was also, Wollstonecraft
urged, writing for revolution.25And for this, shemust write about passion and emotion; because that,
as Godwin had likewise advised, is what her audience wanted to read.26
AsWollstonecraft (1992, p. 43) had famously opined in her own novel,Mary, a ‘true sensibility’ is
a vital strategic weapon in the armoury of the putative feminist revolutionary, the ability to conjure
‘the most exquisite feeling of which the human soul is susceptible . . . this quickness, this delicacy of
25 See Sherman (1997, pp. 147–52) and also Luria (1977, p. 525), referring to Hays as Wollstonecraft’s ‘acolyte’.
In the Preface to her Letters and Essays, published in 1793, Hays (1994, p. 226) paid glowing tribute to a
woman who ‘hath endeavoured to rescue the female mind from the prejudices by which it has been
systematically weakened’. The ‘rights of women, and the name of Wollstonecraft’, she concluded, ‘will go
down to posterity and reverence, when the pointless sarcasms of witlings are forgotten’.
26 Wollstonecraft, of course, wrote novels for precisely this reason, as did Godwin. For a comment on the
conceptual and genetic association of Wollstonecraft’s novels, most especially Maria, and Hays’s, especially
Victim of Prejudice, a genesis which, she suggests, finds a common origin in Godwin’s Caleb Williams, see Ty
(1993, p. 11). See also Poovey (1982, pp. 112–19), discussingWollstonecraft’s strategic turn to the novel form in
order to present, before a distinctively female audience, the violent reality of life for so many of their gender.
ian ward142
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 21 Jul 2011 IP address: 128.240.229.67
feeling, which enables us to relish the sublime touches of the poet, and the painter’. Hays (1994,
pp. 236–38), again, was fully in accord, affirming in an essay in the Critical Review that ‘the most
effectual method of giving instruction is by interesting the imagination and engaging the affections’.
In an essay entitledOnNovelWriting, published in theMonthlyMagazine in 1797, she confirmed once
again that:
‘The business of familiar narrative should be to describe life and manners in real or probable
situations, to delineate the human mind in its endless varieties, to develop the heart, to paint the
passions, to trace the springs of action, to interest the imagination, exercise the affections, and
awaken the powers of the mind . . . Fictitious histories, in the hands of persons of talents and
observation, might be made productive of incalculable benefit; by interesting curiosity, and addres-
sing the common sympathies of our nature, they pervade all ranks; and, judiciously conducted,
would become a powerful and effective engine of truth and reform.’ (Hays, 1994, pp. 242, 244)
Hays was fully versant with the strategies of a poethical jurisprudence.
As we have seen already, the apparent affinity between the ‘cult of sensibility’, radical Dissent and
women writers of the late eighteenth century, imported a range of prejudices. First and foremost,
perhaps, was the supposition that because they wrote about matters of domestic governance, and of
matters of the heart, what they wrote about was not a fit subject for serious public concern. Frederic
Rowton confirmed as much in his populist anthology of women’s poetry, half a century later:
‘Woman has to bear invisible sway over the hidden mechanisms of the heart; and her endowments
are of a meek, persuasive, quiet, and subjective kind. Man rules the mind of the world, woman its
heart’ (Armstrong, 1982, p. 130). Of course, in the very process of writing about such matters, in
revealing to the public gaze the ‘iceberg of everyday misery’ which had hitherto lain largely unseen
beneath the superficial calm of middle English domesticity, this particular prejudice was critically
undercut (Vickery, 2003, p. 73; Surridge, 2005, pp. 3–4, 10). Women like Hays wrote novels because
the audience for which they principally wrote, an audience of middle-class women, liked to read
novels. Of course, the same necessary ambiguities remain prevalent in modern literary criticism.
Thus, in his The Rise of the Modern Novel, IanWatt (1957, p. 298) suggests that the ‘feminine sensibility
was in some ways better equipped to reveal the intricacies of personal relationships and was
therefore at a real advantage in the realm of the novel’. Jill Matus (1995, pp. 4–16) agrees. So does
Nancy Armstrong (1982, pp. 132–38). The subsequent rise of ‘feminine authority in the novel’
coincides with the emergence of an identifiably domestic genre of literature which focused its
attention, not just on matters of the heart, but on the politics of private life.
For much of the century to come, the cause of reformist, as opposed to revolutionary, feminism
would indeed be fought in the parlours and living rooms of middle England, its prospective shaped by
‘what happens within the home’, not what might happen in the streets of London or Paris. Hay’s later
didactic writings, and most especially her various historical studies of famous women, were written
with precisely this strategy in mind. Throughout, she retained a primary concern with prejudice; for
‘the world’, as she had long before affirmed in her Appeal, ‘ever has been, and still is, more guided by
custom and prejudice, than by principle’ (Hays, 1994, p. 231). Twenty-three years later, in the Preface to
her otherwise unmemorable Memoirs of Queens, published in 1821, Hays confirmed:
‘I maintain, and while strength and reason remain to me, ever will maintain, that there is, there
can be but one moral standard of excellence for mankind, whether male or female, and that the
licentious distinctions made by the domineering party, in the spirit of tyranny, selfishness, and
sensuality, are the foundations of the heaviest evils that have afflicted, degraded or corrupted
society.’
Much of the law relating to sexual abuse, of the kind endured by Mary Raymond, has been reformed;
though certainly not all. But beneath the jurisprudential veneer, it might anyway be argued that the
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deeper prejudices have not. There is much in the fate of Mary Raymond which continues to
resonate, as indeed there is in the rather more whimsical travail of Emma Courtney. As Joanna
Burke (2007, p. 10) has recently confirmed, in an important sense, sexual violence is a discursive
violence. The defining myths of rape and sexual assault have a particular cultural and literary
heritage; that claims of rape should be met with a due degree of scepticism; that a woman who
resists enough cannot be raped; that certain women in expressing their sexuality invite their fate;
that narratives of rape should serve to warn women against the perils of transgressing certain
masculine norms of acceptable sexual behaviour; above all, perhaps, that ‘no’ does not always
mean ‘no’. The attendant jurisprudential myths, written again and inevitably by men, likewise
inscribe a peculiarly misogynist law of rape; one that focuses on event rather than experience; that
remains resistant to the idea that women rape and that men get raped; that prefers to immerse itself
in essentially abstract juristic imponderables, such as the absence of ‘consent’, the presence of mind
of ‘the reasonable man’, and the nature and extent of ‘coercion’ (Burke, 2007, pp. 12–13, 213, 239,
320, 389–408).
There are, indeed, ‘disturbing patterns’ in the politics and the literature of sexual violence;
patterns embedded in history and context, and patterns which are embedded in surrounding
mythologies of female sexuality. Primary amongst these, once again, is the dominance of mascu-
line writing, and the necessary ‘silence’ of the female voice. It is this discursive authority which
seeks to define, and thus constrain, alternative conceptions of violence, and responsibility. Men
write the discourse of rape, but it is womenwho are responsible for it (Burke, 2007, pp. 436–39).27 It
is the duty of writers and lawyers sympathetic to the continuing struggle for female emancipation
to write against these textual and jurisprudential prejudices, to retrieve the female voice and to
impress the stark brutality of rape and sexual violence wherever it is encountered. Such, it has been
suggested, is a literature of poetic ‘resistance’ (Higgins and Silver, 1991, pp. 2–4). Mary Hays was
such a poet.
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